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The Dormant Commerce Clause and State-Mandated
Preference Laws in Public Contracting: Developing a
More Substantive Application of the Market-Participant
Exception
Benjamin C. Bair
INTRODUCTION

You are a state legislator. Your state's highway construction industry has seen better days, and unemployment is rising. Nevertheless, cities and counties in your state are hiring nonresident
construction workers and buying cement and gravel from nonresident suppliers. Your constituents are upset that their tax dollars are
going to outsiders, so you decide to draft a bill requiring all local
governments1 in your state to fill at least half of their highway construction positions with state residents. Is such a law valid under
the Commerce Clause2 of the United States Constitution?
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Commerce Clause as
restricting the states' power to regulate interstate commerce, even
when Congress has chosen not to regulate in a particular area.3
More specifically, the Court has construed the Commerce Clause to
proscribe states from discriminating economically against other
states or from adopting regulatory legislation that burdens interstate commerce to a substantially greater extent than it provides
local benefits.4 Because this restriction results from the Commerce
Clause's unstated "negative" implications rather than its explicit
command, it falls under the rubric of the "dormant Commerce
1. "Local governments" include city governments, county governments, municipal governments, school boards, or the governing bodies of any other political subdivisions of the
state.
2. The Commerce Clause states that Congress shall have the power to "regulate Commerce ••• among the several states." U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
3. See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Commn. v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1331, 1335 (1995)
(explaining that the Supreme Court has historically interpreted the Commerce Clause as
limiting state regulatory power); New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273 {1988) {"It
has long been accepted that the Commerce Clause not only grants Congress the authority to
regulate commerce among the states, but also directly limits the ability of the states to discriminate against interstate commerce."); see also Case of the Freight Tax, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.)
232 (1873) (adopting this interpretation of the Commerce Clause for the first time).
4. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970), states:
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest,
and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits. If a legitimate local purpose be found, then the question becomes one of
degree.
397 U.S. at 142 (citation omitted).
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Clause."5 By interpreting "these great silences of the Constitution,"6 the Supreme Court has used the dormant Commerce Clause
to strike down state laws that discriminate against nonresidents or
that unduly burden interstate commerce.7
The Supreme Court has created an exception to the dormant
Commerce Clause, however, that grants states some power to discriminate economically against nonresidents in favor of residents.
This "market-participant" exception allows a state freely to adopt
contracting preferences towards residents if the state participates in
the market as the buying, hiring, or selling agent.8 Under this exception, the Supreme Court has upheld state laws favoring residents
when a state purchases scrap metal,9 buys printing services,10 sells
cement,11 or hires construction workers.12 Local governments can
also adopt laws preferring residents for such public contracts.13
It remains unclear under the dormant Commerce Clause
whether a state government may adopt a "state-mandated preference law" - a law requiring local governments within the state to
prefer state residents for public contracts.14 Many states have en5. New Energy Co., 486 U.S. at 273-74; LAURENCE H. TRmE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 6-2, at 403 {2d ed. 1988).
6. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mand, 336 U.S. 525, 535 (1949).
7. See, e.g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 {1978) (holding unconstitutional a
New Jersey statute that prohibited the importation of solid or liquid waste originated or
collected outside the state); Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) (holding unconstitutional a Madison, WISconsin ordinance that prohibited the sale of milk unless bottled
within five miles of the city); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 {1935) {holding
unconstitutional a New York statute that set a minimum price for milk sold in the state by
nonresident producers).
8. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436 (1980) (distinguishing between "States as
market-participants and States as market regulators").
9. See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
10. See American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F. Supp. 719 (MD. Fla.), affd., 409 U.S.
904 {1973).
11. See Reeves, 447 U.S. at 446-47.
12. See White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
13. See White, 460 U.S. at 214-15 (holding that a city spending its own money on public
contracts may have hiring preferences for city residents because it is a market participant).
14. "Public contracts" include hiring for public construction jobs, purchasing goods with
public funds, or selling goods made from public funds. "Preferring" residents or adopting
"in-state preferences" means giving residents some advantage in obtaining public contracts.
The hiring preference statute involved in W.C.M. Window Co. v. Bernardi, 730 F.2d 486
(7th Cir. 1984), provides a useful example of a state-mandated preference law. The statute in
that case stated that the contractor on " 'any public works project or improvement for the
State of Illinois or any political subdivision •.. thereof shall employ only Illinois laborers on
such project or improvement,' unless the contractor certifies ..• that Illinois laborers either
'are not available, or are incapable of performing the particular type of work involved.'" 730
F.2d at 489 (quoting Iu.. REv. STAT. ch. 48, 'I 271 (1981)). Violation of the preference law
was a misdemeanor punishable by a maximum jail sentence of 30 days and a maximum fine
of $500. 730 F.2d at 489 (citing ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, i 274; ch. 38, i'f l005-8-3(a)(3), 10059-l(a)(3) (1981)).
This Note only examines the federal constitutionality of state-mandated preference laws.
State constitutional or legislative limitations, particularly self-government and home-rule pro-
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acted such preference laws,1s but the federal circuit courts of appeals are split as to whether the Constitution permits them. The
Seventh Circuit struck down a state-mandated preference law
under the dormant Commerce Clause.16 In contrast, the Ninth and
Third Circuits upheld state-mandated preference laws as constitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause.17 The dispute between the circuits centers on the characterization of the relationship
between the state and local governments within the state. The
Ninth and Third Circuits followed the traditional view that local
governments are merely dependent political subdivisions.18 Thus,
they held that the state acts as a market-participant when it enacts a
state-mandated preference law.19 The Seventh Circuit repudiated
this traditional view and decided that the local government in the
case before it possessed substantial autonomy from the state government. Thus, it held that the state acts as a market regulator,
which is unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause,
visions, may restrict the adoption of such laws. See, e.g., Novak v. Perk, 413 N.E.2d 784, 786
(Ohio 1980) (stating that "municipal exercises of authority which involve powers of local self·
government ordinarily prevail over general state laws"); Portland v. Welch, 59 P.2d 228, 231
(Or. 1936) (stating that "[t]he object and purpose of such constitutional provision is to prevent legislative interference and intermeddling with purely municipal affairs"); see also 1
CHEsrER J. ANTIEAu ET AL., MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW§ 3.01, at 7 (1995) ("Home rule
is important to cities in two principal ways. First as a source of municipal power. Secondly,
as a limitation upon legislative control."); cf. Associated Gen. Contractors v. San Francisco,
813 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that the city charter partially invalidated a city ordinance preferring locally-owned businesses in city contracting).
15. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 36.15.050(a) (1994); CAL. GOVT, CODE § 4331 (West 1966);
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, 'l'i 269-74 (1981); KAN. STAT. § 75-3740 (1969).
Risk averse states can take the path chosen by Ohio. Instead of mandating preferences
on local governments, Ohio developed a model system of preferences that any local government may voluntarily adopt. See Omo ADMIN. CooE 123:5-1-32 (1994) (adopted pursuant
to Omo REv. CooE ANN. § 125.111 (Anderson 1994)). Ohio based the model preference on
a state-level preference law already in existence. Omo REv. CooE ANN.§§ 125.09, 125.111
(Anderson 1994). This path may not achieve all of the beneficial effects sought by the state,
but it would be constitutionally permissible because cities are currently free to adopt their
own preferences. White, 460 U.S. at 204.
16. See W.C.M. Window Co. v. Bernardi, 730 F.2d 486, 496-98 (7th Cir. 1984}.
17. See Big Country Foods, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 952 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1992); 'Ii'ojan
Technologies, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1212
(1991). The statute in Trojan Technologies was actually a buy-American law rather than a
state resident preference, but this fact did not alter the court's analysis of the market-participant issue. See 916 F.2d at 909-12. This fact does matter, however, under the test this Note
proposes. See infra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208,
215 (1984); Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 187 (1923) (stating that a state "may with·
hold, grant or withdraw powers and privileges as it sees fit. However great or small [the
municipality's] sphere of action, it remains the creature of the State exercising and holding
powers and privileges subject to the sovereign will."); see also 1 ANTIEAU, supra note 14,
§ 2.00 (discussing the nearly complete control by states of municipalities); infra notes 45-46
and accompanying text.
19. See Big Country, 952 F.2d at 1179; Trojan Technologies, 916 F.2d at 911-12.
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when it adopts a state-mandated preference law, at-least when that
law applies to an autonomous local government.2 0
This Note argues that the current focus on the relationship between states and their local governments as the key determinant of
the constitutional validity of state-mandated preference laws is
fl.awed. Instead, a court considering the validity of a state-mandated preference law should uphold such a law only if it distributes
the benefits of state expenditures to state residents and does not
excessively burden interstate commerce.
Part I describes dormant Commerce Clause doctrine and the
market-participant exception. This Part then argues that courts
currently evaluate whether to apply the market-participant exception to state-mandated preference laws based on whether they characterize the local governments affected by the law as politically
dependent subdivisions of the state or as autonomous entities. Part
II examines the theoretical rationales for the market-participant exception and argues that the moral and political entitlement of state
residents to state funds, and the built-in spending restraints of
resident-preference laws, are the rationales that actually justify the
market-participant exception and define its scope. This Part then
applies these rationales to state-mandated preference laws and argues that courts should uphold some of these laws under the
market-participant exception. This Part also explains why the current focus on state-local government relationships fails to identify
those state-mandated preference laws that are supported by the rationales for the market-participant exception. Part m draws on
dormant Commerce Clause and Privilege and Immunities Clause21
jurisprudence and concludes that under the market-participant exception to the dormant Commerce Clause, a court should permit a
particular state-mandated preference law if the state is spending the
funds of its own residents, if no nondiscriminatory alternatives exist, and if the law's burden on interstate commerce does not substantially outweigh its local benefit.
I.

THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE, THE MARKETPARTICIPANT EXCEPTION, AND THE CURRENT
APPROACH TO STATE-MANDATED
PREFERENCE LAWS

Because state-mandated preference laws interfere with interstate commerce and discriminate economically against nonresidents, such laws may violate the dormant Commerce Clause. If
20. See W.C.M. Window, 730 F.2d at 495.
21. The Privileges and Immunities Clause states that "[t]he Citizens of each State shall be
entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." U.S. CoNST. art.
IV, §2.
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state-mandated preferences are to pass constitutional muster under
current law, they must fall within the market-participant exception
to the dormant Commerce Clause. Section I.A summarizes dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Section I.B then describes
the market-participant exception to the dormant Commerce
Clause. Finally, section I.C argues that courts currently evaluate
whether to apply the market-participant exception to state-mandated preference laws based on how they characterize the relationship between the state and the local governments within the state.
A. The Dormant Commerce Clause
The dormant Commerce Clause prohibits state regulations that
unnecessarily burden interstate commerce. Its main thrust is to
preserve the national economy and to prevent the political and economic balkanization of the states that occurred under the Articles
of Confederation, when states fought destructive trade wars with
each other.22 Although Commerce Clause doctrine has varied considerably over time,23 the current test for state regulations under
the dormant Commerce Clause focuses on two distinct elements.
First, the state must be pursuing a legitimate state end,24 The
Court generally has accepted health, safety, and welfare concerns as
legitimate state ends,25 but it usually rejects economic concerns,
particularly when the state economically discriminates in favor of
22. See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Commn. v. Jefferson Lines, Inc. 115 S. Ct. 1331, 1335-36
(1995) (stating that "the Commerce Clause's purpose [is] preventing a State from retreating
into economic isolation or jeopardizing the welfare of the Nation as a whole" and citing
numerous historical references relating to the prevention of economic balkanization that occurred under the Articles of Confederation); H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525,
533-35 (stating that the Framers designed the Commerce Clause to protect "the peace and
safety of the Union" and to promote "solidarity and prosperity"); see also Letter of February
13, 1829, from James Madison to J.C. Cabell, in 3 THE RECORDS OF nm FEDERAL CONVEN·
noN OF 1787, at 478 (M. Farrand ed., 1911) (stating that the Commerce Clause "grew out of
the abuse of the power by the importing States in trucing the non-importing, and was intended
as a negative and preventive provision against injustice among the States themselves").
23. Initially, the Supreme Court attempted to distinguish between "local" regulations
pursuant to the state's police power and "national" regulations that required uniform treatment. See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). Later, the Court
attempted to distinguish between regulations that "directly" or "indirectly" affected inter·
state commerce. See, e.g., Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Blackwell, 244 U.S. 310 (1917); Smith v.
Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 482 (1888). The Court eventually abandoned this approach in NLRB
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301U.S.1 (1937), and Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942), for more empirically based tests. See TRIBE, supra note 5, § 5-4. For the current test
under the dormant Commerce Clause, see infra notes 24-32 and accompanying text.
24. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
25. See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) (recognizing that protecting the state's
baitfish population was a legitimate objective); Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346 (1933) (hold·
ing that states may require nonresident suppliers of cattle to certify that the cattle are free of
Bang's disease).
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residents over nonresidents.2 6 One of the primary motivations for
protecting nonresidents from such discriminatory measures is that
they are not represented in the political process of the discriminating state. Therefore, they have no way of protecting themselves
from the adverse economic effects of other states' regulations.27
The Court has upheld even facially discriminatory statutes, however, when the proffered justifications were sufficiently important.28
If a court determines that the state is pursuing a legitimate state
end, then it will measure whether the burden of the regulation on
interstate commerce substantially outweighs the putative local benefi.t.29 In performing this analysis, the court may look to whether
the state could have adopted any less discriminatory or less burden26. See Lewis v. BT Investment Mgrs., Inc., 447 U.S. 27 (1980) (holding unconstitutional
a statute that prevented nonresident banks and bank holding companies from owning a resident investment advisory firm); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commn., 432
U.S. 333 (1977) (holding unconstitutional a statute that required nonresident producers of
apples to repack their product or change their labeling); see also C & A Carbone, Inc. v.
Town of Clarkston, 114 S. Ct. 1677, 1683 (1994) (stating that "[d]iscrimination against interstate commerce in favor of local business or investment is per se invalid, save in a narrow
class of cases in which the municipality can demonstrate, under rigorous scrutiny, that it has
no other means to advance a legitimate local interest"); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey,
437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (stating that "simple economic protectionism" is subject to a virtually per se rule of invalidity).
27. See Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 675 (1981) (rejecting the
presumption that "a State's own political processes will serve as a check against unduly burdensome regulations" when those regulations discriminate against interstate commerce);
Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767-68 n.2 (1945) ("[T]he Court has often recognized that to the extent ••. the burden of state regulation falls on interests outside the state, it
is unlikely to be alleviated by the operation of those political restraints normally exerted
when interests within the state are affected."); see also TRIBE, supra note 5:
In [the dormant Commerce Clause] context, the rhetoric of judicial deference to democratically fashioned judgments of legislatures is often inapposite. The checks on which
we rely to curb the abuse of legislative power - election and recall - are simply unavailable to those who have no effective voice or vote in the jurisdiction which harms
them..•• Whatever may be the general merit of a system of judicial review which sanctions intervention by the counter-democratic courts only when the normal processes of
democracy have broken down, that model is of little use if mechanically applied in the
context of interstate commerce, where problems often arise precisely because the individual state's democratic processes have worked well
Id. § 6-5, at 409 (citation omitted).
28. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) (upholding a ban on the importation of live
baitfish infected with parasites).
29. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). Some members of the Court
disfavor balancing in the dormant Commerce Clause context See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics
Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 95 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that the balancing test is
"ill suited to the judicial function and should be undertaken rarely if at all"); Kassel, 450 U.S.
at 691-92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that the balancing test could lead to anomalous
results in similar cases); see also Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1091, 1101-08, 1197
(1986) (arguing that the Court, despite its language, actually has not performed any balancing
and should not do so except in the context of the market-participant exception). The Pike
test remains the law, however. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkston, 114 S. Ct.
1677, 1682 (1994).
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some altematives.3o On the one hand, if the state cannot present
sufficient evidence that the regulation provides a substantial and
legitimate local benefit, especially if the statute discriminates
against nonresidents, then the court will usually strike down the
statute as a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.31 On the
other hand, if the state can present evidence that the statute
presents only a small burden, particularly when that burden applies
to both residents and nonresidents equally, then the court will probably uphold the law.32
B. The Market-Participant Exception to the Dormant
Commerce Clause

Under the market-participant exception to the dormant Commerce Clause, a state may burden commerce or even facially discriminate against nonresidents whenever it engages in "direct ...
participation in the market. "33 The Supreme Court created the exception in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 34 in which it upheld a
30. See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) (holding that while the state could
legitimately protect its minnow supply, it had not tried to do so in a nondiscriminatory fashion); A & P Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976) (holding that if other states refuse to
accept Mississippi milk, Mississippi's remedy should be a court challenge rather than exclusion of the discriminatory state's milk); Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354-56
(1951) (stating that the state could have protected residents from tainted milk without completely prohibiting the importation of milk into the city).
31. See, e.g., Kosse~ 450 U.S. at 662 (holding unconstitutional a prohibition on the use of
trucks longer than 65 feet because it disproportionately affected nonresidents); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (holding unconstitutional a regulation that prohibited the importation of solid waste from nonresidents); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325
U.S. 761 (1945) (holding unconstitutional a prohibition on the use of longer trains than common in Arizona because the improvement in safety was marginal compared to the restriction
on interstate commerce).
32. See, e.g., South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938)
(holding constitutional a prohibition on the use of particularly heavy trucks because the regulation affected both intrastate and interstate traffic). But see Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines,
359 U.S. 520 (1959) (holding unconstitutional a nondiscriminatory regulation requiring certain mudguards because the safety advantages were unclear).
Technically, courts have examined a third element: whether the proposed regulation is
rationally related to the state's legitimate objective. See Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. at 191-92.
Practically, however, this requirement is empty. The Court has expressed its willingness to
defer to legislative decisions for this requirement. See Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. at 189-92.
Moreover, the examination of less discriminatory alternatives will ensure that the regulation
not only rationally relates to the state's objective but also that it achieves that objective better than other regulations.
33. White v•. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204, 208 (1983) (quoting Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436 n.7 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting)).
34. 426 U.S. 794 (1976). Arguably, American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 409 U.S. 904
(1972), was the first case in which the Court recognized a distinction between state regulation
and state market activity. In Askew, a panel of three district court judges upheld under the
Commerce Clause a Florida statute requiring all public printing for the state to be done
within the state. 339 F. Supp. 719, 725 (M.D. Fla. 1972). The Supreme Court merely affirmed the opinion of the panel, however, without explaining its specific reasoning. 409 U.S.
at 904.
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Maryland statute that promised a cash "bounty" to scrap processors
licensed by the state for the destruction of any vehicle formerly titled in Maryland. The Court held that when the state eschews its
role as a government entity and enters the market as a "private
actor," as Maryland did when it offered to buy the vehicles, then
the dormant Commerce Clause does not govern it activities.35
Under this market-participant exception, the Court has also upheld
a state's ability to sell state-produced cement preferentially to residents36 and to hire residents over nonresidents for public construction projects.37
The Court has created two notable limitations on the applicability of the market-participant exception. In South-Central Timber
Development v. Wunnicke, 38 Alaska adopted a requirement that all
successful bidders on state-owned timber resources partially process the timber in Alaska prior to shipping it out of the state.39 The
Supreme Court held that this "primary manufacture" requirement
violated the dormant Commerce Clause because the state was attempting to control the post-contractual disposition of the timber.
The Court explained that this "downstream restriction" made the
market-participant exception inapplicable because the state was attempting to govern separate, private economic relationships.40 In
New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 41 an Ohio statute provided a tax credit
for sales of Ohio-produced ethanol. It did not provide that credit
for ethanol produced in another state, however, unless that state
had a reciprocal tax credit for Ohio-produced ethanol.42 The
Supreme Court struck down the statute, stating that taxation is a
"primeval government activity" that is not analogous to private
market activity.43 Thus, the market-participant exception generally
will not apply to any state activity that comes closer to traditional
government functions like regulation or taxation, although it is far
from clear how courts should make this distinction in specific cases.

C. State-Mandated Preference Laws and the Market-Participant
Exception
Courts applying the market-participant test to state-mandated
preference laws have focused on the relationship between the state
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 805-10.
See Reeves, 441 U.S. at 429.
See White, 460 U.S. at 214-15.
467 U.S. 82 (1984).
See 461 U.S. at 84-86.
467 U.S. at 98-99.
486 U.S. 269 (1988).
See 486 U.S. at 271-73.
486 U.S. at 277.
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passing such a law and its 19cal governments to determine the applicability of the exception. Because the market-participant exception
focuses on whether the state is "directly participating" in the market or whether it is "regulating" the market,44 courts have attempted to decide whether states are acting through their local
governments as political agents or whether they are acting on their
local governments' distinct contracting activity. There are essentially" two different views of this relationship that courts have taken
- the traditional view of local governments as "creatures of the
state" and the more contemporary view of local governments as potentially autonomous entities.
Under traditional doctrine governing state-local relationships,
states enacting state-mandated preference laws would always be
acting as market-participants. Traditionally, courts viewed local
governments as dependent "political subdivisions" or "creatures of
the state."45 Applying this doctrine, a state enacting a statemandated preference law would merely be restricting the contracting activity of one of its own political arms. All contracts with
the Ideal government essentially would be contracts \vith the state.
Therefore, under this interpretation, states enacting state-mandated
preference laws would be "directly participating" in the market.46
Under a more contemporary - and more complex - interpretation of state-local relationships, states enacting state-mandated
preference laws would be market participants only in certain circumstances. The Supreme Court often has treated local governments as distinct, separate entities from state governments. For
example, local governments do not share state immunity from antitrust laws47 or section 1983 constitutional tort actions.48 In addition, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits against local
governments in federal court,49 and local governments are citizens
for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.so For the purpose of deter44. See supra notes 34-43 and accompanying text.
45. See, e.g., Wtlliams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 40 (1933); City of Trenton v.
New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 188 (1923); see also 1 .ANTIEAU, supra note 14, § 2.00 (stressing that
states have nearly complete control of local governments). See generally Carol F. Lee, The
Federal Courts and the Status of Municipalities: A Conceptual Challenge, 62 B.U. L. RBv. 1
(1982).
46. See, e.g., Big Country Foods v. Board of Educ., 952 F.2d 1173, 1179 (9th Cir. 1992);
Trojan Technologies v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903, 911 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S.
1212 (1991).
47. See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
48. See Monell v. Department of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
49. See Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280-81 (1977);
Workman v. New York, 179 U.S. 552, 563-66 (1900).
50. See Moor v. Alameda County, 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
Treating local governments as independent entities also comports more with legal and
political reality. State constitutions often confer significant spheres of power to local governments through home-rule provisions. See supra note 14. Although home-rule provisions
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mining the applicability of the market-participant exception to
states enacting state-mandated preference laws, courts could evaluate the autonomy of the particular local government entity affected
by the law.51 If the local government is actually dependent, then
the result should be the same as under traditional doctrine - the
state is acting as a market participant. But, if the local government
possesses substantial independence - through its ability to raise
revenues or control its own affairs, for example - then the state
would be regulating the economic activity of an independent actor
and would not be a market participant.52
Therefore, courts applying either the traditional or the more
contemporary approach to state-local government relationships
must focus on the dependence of the local government as the key to
applying the market-participant exception to state-mandated preference laws. Courts applying the traditional approach assume dependence, while courts applying the more contemporary approach
actually measure dependence. Under both approaches, states mandating preferences on dependent local governments are acting as
market participants, whereas states mandating preferences on autonomous local governments are acting as regulators.
There are two potential problems with treating state and local
governments as a single market participant. One problem is that
state governments often do not have formal privity of contract with
local construction workers, which makes a state-mandated preference law look more like regulation than direct market-participation. White v. Council of Construction Employers, 53 however,
suggests that formal privity is not necessary. In White, the mayor of
Boston had issued an executive order requiring that all construction
projects funded by the city have a work force composed of at least
fifty percent Boston residents.54 The Council argued that the
have not always been successful in guaranteeing local autonomy, see, e.g., Gerald Frug, The
City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARv. L. REv.1057, 1117 (1980); Terrance Sandalow, The Limits
of Municipal Power Under Home Rule, 48 MINN. L. REv. 643, 652 (1964), such provisions
have generally given local governments considerable lawmaking power. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I - The Structure of Local Gdvemment Law, 90 CoLuM. L. REv.
1, 9-18 (1990) (defending the effectiveness of home-rule provisions).
51. See, e.g., W.C.M. Window Co. v. Bernardi, 730 F.2d 486, 493-98 (7th Cir. 1984); see
also Barton B. Clark, Comment, Give 'Em Enough Rope: States, Subdivisions, and the Market Participant Exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 615, 627-28
(1993) (suggesting that courts should measure the autonomy of a state's local governments to
determine the constitutionality of state-mandated preference laws).
52. W.C.M. Window, 730 F.2d at 495 ("The 'market participant' is the school board, just
as the market participant in White was the city of Boston. The state is the regulator, telling
thousands of local government units that they must not give construction contracts to employers of nonresidents.").
53. 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
54. Interestingly, the executive order was based on a Massachusetts law that required
each county, town, or district to prefer veterans and residents in hiring for public construction projects. See 460 U.S. at 224 n.8 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
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mayor's order reached beyond market participation because it interfered with the contractual relations of two private parties public contractors and their employees. The Supreme Court responded that "the Commerce Clause does not require the city to
stop at the boundary of formal privity of contract" because
"[e]veryone affected by the order is, in a substantial if informal
sense, 'working for the city.' " 55 Therefore, it appears that formal
privity between the contracting parties and the state is not necessary for the market-participant exception to apply to statemandated preference laws.56
Another potential and related problem with treating state and
local governments as a single market participant is that statemandated preference laws appear to operate like the regulations
that the Court struck down in South-Central Timber Development v.
Wunnicke. 51 As mentioned earlier,58 South-Central limits the ability of states to impose "downstream restrictions" on its contracting
partners, thereby effecting separate, private economic relationships.
Because state-mandated preference laws restrict the ability of local
governments to contract with construction workers and firms, arguably such state laws pose invalid restrictions on the "downstream" local hiring market. A simple, but probably unsatisfying
and somewhat circular, answer to this problem is that under the
"arm-of-the-state" dependency theory, courts can view the state's
mandated preference law as essentially affecting the state's own
contractual relationships rather than those of a separate "downstream" entity. Thus, measuring the dependence or autonomy of
local governments to determine whether the market-participant ex(citing MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 149, § 26 (West 1982)). The Massachusetts Supreme
Court also struck down this law when it invalidated the mayor's executive order. See Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers v. Mayor of Boston, 425 N.E.2d 346, 352-53 (Mass.
1981). Because the Commonwealth did not appeal this part of the lower decision, the
Supreme Court did not decide the issue of whether a state-mandated preference is constitutional. 460 U.S. at 224 n.8 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
SS. 460 U.S. at 211 n.7. But see 460 U.S. at 223 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (arguing that "[t]he 'sense' in which those affected by the Mayor's order
'work for the city' ••• lack[s] substance altogether" because the state does not hire, fire, pay,
or negotiate with construction workers or subcontractors).
S6. Cf. Trojan Technologies v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903, 911 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
SOl U.S. 1212 (1991) (arguing by analogy that under a state-mandated preference law, suppli·
ers of a local government are "supplying for the state"). The two situations are not perfectly
analogous, however. The Supreme Court relied in White on the fact that the city was spending its own money. White, 460 U.S. at 214-lS {"Insofar as the city expended its own funds in
entering into construction contracts for public projects, it was a market participant ••••"). In
White, the public contractor acted almost like an intermediary agent for the local government, which supplied the actual payroll. Under some state-mandated preference laws, however, the state government does not supply funds, at least directly, to carry out the
preferences.
57. 467 U.S. 82 (1984).
S8. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
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ception applies to state-mandated preference laws would be consistent with current market-participant case law.
A more complex, and more satisfactory, answer to whether
state-mandated preference laws constitute downstream restrictions
would require an examination of the rationales that justify the market-participant exception to the dormant Commerce Clause. For
the market-participant exception to be what it purports to be - an
exception to the dormant Commerce Clause - it must reflect the
balance of values underlying the dormant Commerce Clause. The
dormant Commerce Clause protects the states' ability to enact legitimate regulatory measures.s9 At the same time, it exists to prevent trade wars and economic balkanization.60 Consequently, the
rationales for the market-participant exception must allow only legitimate regulations that do not excessively burden interstate commerce. If these rationales apply to state-mandated preference laws,
then such laws should be constitutional under the market-participant exception. If these rationales do not apply, however, then
courts should strike such laws down as impermissible downstream
restrictions.
II.

STATE-MANDATED PREFERENCE LAWS, STATE-LoCAL
RELATIONSHIPS, AND THE RATIONALES FOR THE
MARKET-PARTICIPANT EXCEPTION TO THE
DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE

Although the market-participant exception to the dormant
Commerce Clause seems to represent an appropriate accommodation to state regulatory power in the abstract, defining its exact justification and scope has confounded the Supreme Court and
numerous commentators. In fact, many commentators have urged
the Court to abolish the exception.61 Nevertheless, two rationales
59. See supra notes 25, 28 and accompanying text.
60. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
61. See South-Central Tlnlber Dev. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 101 (1984) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) ("In my view, Justice White's treatment of the market-participant doctrine and
the response of Justice Rehnquist point up the inherent weakness of the doctrine."); Swin
Resource Sys. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245, 262 (3d Cir. 1989) (Gibbons, CJ., dissenting); Theodore Y. Blumoff, The State Proprietary Exception to the Dormant Commerce
Clause: A Persistent Nineteenth Century Anomaly, 1984 S. lu.. U. LJ. 73, 76-77; A. Dan
Tarlock, National Power, State Resource Sovereignty and Federalism in the 1980's: Scaling
America's Magic Mountain, 32 U. KAN. L. REv. 111, 133 (1983); Tlnlothy P. Collins, Casenote, 27 WAYNE L REv. 1575, 1590 (1981); Carol A. Fortine, Note, The Commerce Clause
and Federalism: Implications for State Control of Natural Resources, 50 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
601 (1982); Greer L. Phillips, Comment, Commerce Clause Immunity for State Proprietary
Activities: Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 4 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POLY. 365 (1981); Adam B. Schiff,
Comment, State Discriminatory Action Against Nonresidents: Using the Original Position
Theory as a Framework for Analysis, 22 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 583, 587 (1985); William L.
Thorpe, Note, State Purchasing Activity Excluded from Commerce Clause Review - Hughes
v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 18 B.C. IND. & CoMM. L REV. 893, 901 (1977).
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have emerged that both justify the market-participant exception
and define its scope - the moral and political entitlement of state
residents to the benefit of state funds and the built-in spending restraints of resident contractual preference laws. These two rationales identify how resident preference laws have a legitimate
justification and how they do not always burden commerce
excessively.
Section II.A describes these rationales in detail and argues that
they provide a benchmark against which courts should evaluate
whether the market-participant exception applies to state-mandated preference laws. Section Il.B then applies these two rationales to state-mandated preference laws and concludes that
although not all such laws are justifiable under these rationales, the
market-participant exception should nevertheless apply to some
state-mandated preference laws. Section II.C argues, however, that
the current application of the market-participant exception to statemandated preference laws - by focusing on state-local relationships - fails to adequately distinguish between laws that comport
with the rationales of the market participant exception and those
that do not. This section demonstrates the need for courts to develop a different application of the market-participant exception to
state-mandated preference laws.
A. The Rationales for the Market-Participant Exception
The Supreme Court and various legal commentators have suggested many possible rationales for the market-participant exception to the dormant Commerce Clause. Only two of these
rationales, however, actually justify the exception and define its
scope. First, preferring residents when spending their money is a
legitimate state objective as a matter of moral and political theory.
Second, preferences that require the expenditure of state funds
have built-in restraints that may make them less politically and econoµrically divisive than other discriminatory state laws. Both of
these rationales actually focus on the concerns of the dormant
Commerce Clause - protecting legitimate regulation while avoiding excessive burdens on interstate commerce. The other rationales
either fail to provide sufficient guidance for lower courts to define
the limits of the exception, or they fail completely to justify the
exception.
The Supreme Court itself may have misgivings about the market-participant exception.
In New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988}, the Court held that a tax credit given by
the state of Ohio to promote the sale of ethanol fell under the state's "distinctive governmental capacity," making the market-participant exception inapplicable. 486 U.S. at 277. The
solution, however, is not to replace one empty label - "market participant" - with another
- "distinctive governmental capacity."
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Moral and political theory suggests that states may legitimately
prefer their own citizens in public contracting because they are
spending state funds. The money that states spend comes mostly
from residents through various taxes, tolls, and levies. Thus, these
residents have a greater claim to the benefit of these resources than
nonresidents do. 62 Some commentators have referred to this justification as the "sow-and-reap" rationale63 or the "Lockean labor-desert theoryt64 because the residents have labored to earn money
that they then "sow" in the form of taxes to the state. When the
state later spends this "sown" money, residents deserve to "reap"
the benefits of those expenditures. In other words, states should be
able to allocate expenditures of state funds to residents before nonresidents. Other forms of interstate discrimination, such as taxes
and tariffs on nonresidents, do not require the state to spend any
62. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980):
The State's refusal to sell to buyers other than South Dakotans is "protectionist" only in
the sense that it limits benefits generated by a state program to those who fund the state
treasury and whom the State was created to serve.... Such policies, while perhaps
"protectionist" in a loose sense, reflect the essential and patently unobjectionable purpose of state government - to serve the citizens of the state.
447 U.S. at 442; see also Dan T. Coenen, Untangling the Market-Participant Exemption to the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 MICH. L. REv. 395, 421 (1989); Regan, supra note 29, at 119495; Jonathan D. Varat, State "Citizenship" and Interstate Equality, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 487, 523
(1981).
Professor Laurence Tribe has offered a variation on this theory that focuses on whether
the state "created" the commerce at issue. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHmcES
146 (1985) ("The principle that necessarily underlies the market participant-market regulator
distinction is that, when the state is c;reating commerce that would otherwise not exist, it has
greater freedom to shape that commerce than when it is merely intruding into a previously
existing market."). The Supreme Court, however, expressly rejected this rationale in Reeves,
447 U.S. at 446 n.18, and some commentators have criticized its explanatory power. See
Coenen, supra, at 410-13 (arguing that Professor Tribe's commerce creation rationale is underinclusive because it cannot explain Alexandria Scrap and Reeves).
Another variation that exists on this rationale involves treating the state like a "private
actor" because it is spending its own money. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 51, at 627-28; William L. Kovacs & Anthony A. Anderson, States as Market Participants in Solid Waste Dispo·
sal Services - Fair Competition or the Destruction of the Private Sector?, 18 ENVrL. L.J. 779,
803 (1988); see also Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 438-39 (1980) (arguing, in support of
the market-participant exception, that states have the same right as private parties to choose
their trading partners and that states face the same limitations as private market participants). Professor Tribe points out that there is a certain irony in using the private-party
image to justify the state's ability to promote the welfare of its citizens. See TRIBE, supra
note 5, § 6-11, at 432. Moreover, Professor Karl Manheim observes that analogizing state
activity to private behavior might spawn exceptions, such as the state as monopolist. See Karl
Manheim, New-Age Federalism and the Market-Participant Doctrine, 22 Aruz. ST. L.J. 559,
608 (1990); cf. Clark, supra note 51, at 629-32 (applying antitrust concepts to the private party
model). Ultimately, the "private party" label seems as conclusory as the current "market
participant" label because it fails to account for the rationales supporting the market-participant exception.
63. Coenen, supra note 62, at 421-26.
64. Varat, supra note 62, at 522-23. Professor Varat recognizes that limitations may exist
on a state's ability to exclude nonresidents on this rationale. If a state possesses an overabundance of resources and exclusion of nonresidents will unnecessarily disrupt the economy, the
resident preference should be impermissible. This is particularly true when the nonresident
offers to pay her fair share of state taxes. Id. at 531-36.
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taxpayer-contributed money. Therefore, preferential state spending is more legitimate morally and politically than discriminatory
taxes or tariffs.
Contractual preferences for residents are also less likely than
other discriminatory regulations to place excessive burdens on interstate commerce. Discriminatory taxes and tariffs appear to cost
the state very little to enact or administer because they either produce income or merely reduce tax revenues.6s Contractual preferences and subsidies,66 conversely, have, as Professor Donald Regan
has argued, built-in restraints because they require the expenditure
of limited state funds.67 This means that contractual preferences
will be more expensive to create and administer than discriminatory
taxes and tariffs, so they are more likely to be limited in scope. 68 In
addition, discriminatory taxes and tariffs encourage retaliation from
other states, creating a "race-to-the-bottom" situation that might
eventually hamper or destroy free trade.69 Contractual preferences
are less likely to engender such retaliation because other states may
recognize the political legitimacy of a state preferring its own residents with state funds.1 0 Both the "expensiveness" of spending
preferences and the lesser likelihood of retaliation are "built-in restraints" in the sense that they are natural components of spending
preferences that pose less of a burden on interstate commerce than
other discriminatory measures.
Naturally, neither of these rationales justifies all contractual
preferences. In many instances, the state may be spending money
that it cannot completely attribute to its own residents. For exam65. In fact, most discriminatory measures rarely have beneficial effects and often impose
administrative and efficiency costs that states can never recoup. See, e.g., PAUL A. SAMUELSON, EcoNoMics 679 (10th ed. 1977) (making this argument in the context of international
trade).
66. Although the Supreme Court has never had to decide whether subsidies are constitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause, it has indicated general approval of such measures. See, e.g., West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205, 2214 & n.15 (1994); New
Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988); see also West Lynn Creamery, 114 S. Ct. at
2220 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that the Court implicitly upheld subsidies in a marketparticipant case, Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976)). But see Regan,
supra note 29, at 1196 (arguing that the Court should not uphold subsidies because such
measures can easily distort the market).
67. See Regan, supra note 29, at 1194-95. Of course, even contractual preferences create
economic inefficiency. See, e.g., Donald E. Jordan, Comment, In-State Preferences in Public
Contracting: States' Rights Versus Economic Sectionalism, 49 U. CoLO. L. RBv. 205, 216
(1978) (discussing the questionable benefits of contractual preferences). A simple example
can help demonstrate this phenomenon. If a nonresident can complete a contract for
$100,000, whereas a resident will charge $120,000, then a resident preference will create an
inefficiency of $20,000 on the contract.
68. See Coenen, supra note 62, at 434-35 (stating that while discriminatory taxes and subsidies are also "expensive," the costs are often hidden; thus, residents will be more likely to
vote for such laws than for contractual preferences); Regan, supra note 29, at 1194-95.
69.' See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 127-30 (1993).
70. See Coenen, supra note 62, at 433-44; Regan, supra note 29, at 1194-95.
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ple, the money may come from federal subsidies or from taxes or
licensing fees paid by nonresidents. Moreover, even when the state
is spending money derived from its own residents for contractual
preferences, some economic inefficiencies will result, and other
states still may retaliate with their own discriminatory preferences,
taxes, or subsidies.71 Consequently, courts should strike down
those contractual preferences that create large inefficiencies or unnecessarily risk retaliation. Nevertheless, these two rationales explain why it is logical in light of the concerns underlying the
dormant Commerce Clause to use a mechanism like the marketparticipant exception to differentiate at least some contractual preferences from other discriminatory measures.
Two other rationales for the market-participant exception do
provide some theoretical support for exception, but they fail to define its scope clearly and thus they fail to provide any guidelines for
lower courts. First, the Supreme Court has stated that the political
nature of state proprietary activity makes congressional action
more appropriate than judicial intervention.72 Second, the Court
has expressed concern that restraining the states' ability to enact
preference laws would impinge on their traditional role as experimental laboratories.73 Both of these rationales - essentially encouraging judicial restraint and respect for federalism - are
appropriate considerations in light of the entitlement and built-in
restraint rationales discussed above. Because residents are more
entitled to the benefit of their own resources, courts should be more
reluctant to strike resident-preference laws down. In addition, because these laws have fewer negative effects on interstate commerce, states should have greater freedom to enact such laws and
structure them in ways most beneficial to state residents.
Neither of the Supreme Court's rationales, however, provides a
satisfactory guide to distinguishing between constitutional and unconstitutional preference laws. As Professor Dan Coenen observes,
a general policy of judicial restraint under the dormant Commerce
Clause "might equally well justify judicial noninterference with
71. See supra note 64.
72. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 439 (1980}; cf. Wisconsin Dept. of Indus.,
Labor & Human Rel. v. Gould, Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 286-91 (1986} (stating that Congress can
reverse market-participant rulings). Commentators have differed over whether donnant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence calls for judicial restraint or whether it actually calls for
judicial activism. Compare Coenen, supra note 62, at 439 (arguing that the possibility of
congressional preemption does provide a weak "background" justification for judicial restraint if other factors counsel a cautious approach} with TRIBE, supra note 5, § 6-2, at 404
(contending that the "blend of judicial and legislative activity" that characterizes dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence actually encourages judicial activism).
73. See Reeves, 441 U.S. at 441; see also TRIBE, supra note 5, § 6-11, at 434 (stating that
the market-participant exception "usher[ed] in a new day of federalism"); Coenen, supra
note 62, at 441 (observing the importance of federalism, experimentation, and "optimal responsiveness to local concerns").
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state regulatory and tax programs that discriminate against interstate commerce,"74 but such discriminatory measures are clearly
unconstitutional. General notions of respect for federalism encounter the same problem. In a spirit of economic "experimentation,"
states could enact preference laws whose burdensome effects on
commerce far outweigh the legitimacy of the residents' entitlement
to state funds. Neither a general policy of judicial restraint or of
respect for federalism could explain why the Court upheld Boston's
resident preference law in White v. Massachusetts Council of
Construction Employers1 s and struck down Alaska's primary-manufacture requirement in South-Central Timber Development v.
Wunnicke. 76
Finally, some commentators have attempted to justify the market-participant exception on economic theory grounds. They assert
that contractual preference laws encourage states to spend resources on public contracts, whereas forcing states to spend their
funds on nonresiden~s imperils such spending.77 Professor Mark
Gergen further argues that resident-preference laws can actually
encourage efficiency because such laws force states to internalize
the costs of their actions.78 These arguments appear neither compelling nor accurate. Although economic prosperity is an important
value under the Commerce Clause, the Court has always rejected
efforts at interstate discrimination when motivated merely by economic gain.79 Moreover, resident preferences often cause more
economic harm than good,80 and are as likely to be the result of
74. Coenen, supra note 62, at 439.
75. 460 U.S. 204 {1983).
76. 467 U.S. 82 (1984).
77. See Mark P. Gergen, The Selfish State and the Market, 66 TEXAS L. REV. 1097, 1112
{1988); see also Regan, supra note 29, at 1194-95.
78. See Gergen, supra note 77, at 1111.
79. See supra note 26 and accompanying text; see also CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of
Am., 481 U.S. 69, 92 {1987) {"The Constitution does not require the states to subscribe to any
particular economic theory."); Thomas K. Anson & P. M. Schenkkan, Federalism, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and State-Owned Resources, 59 TEXAS L. REV. 71, 78 n.31 (1980)
{"The assumption that the commerce clause embodies a free trade value •.. is erroneous");
Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Res~ 91 YALE LJ. 425, 434 (1982)
{"The commerce clause •.. cannot be said to establish and protect free trade or a national
marketplace as a fundamental constitutional value.").
80. See supra notes 65, 67 and accompanying text. Despite his general encouragement of
resident preferences, Professor Gergen suggests that resident buying and hiring preferences
should be per se illegal because they are "impure" subsidies. Gergen, supra note 77, at 1134.
Unfortunately, he never fully explains this distinction, particularly when he states that preference programs like that in White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S.
204 (1983), "fall well within the principle that a state may limit the benefits of public programs." Gergen, supra note 77, at 1141. Perhaps his aversion to such preferences derives
from a concern that they promote political favoritism and undermine basic principles of free
trade and private ownership: "Would we really permit a socialist government in Vermont to
defeat free trade by collectivizing its retail establishments, factories, and towns?" Id. at 1143.
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parochial politics as of rational decisionmaking.81 Hence, it is un·likely that such preferences will maximize economic welfare.
Therefore, the only two rationales that justify the market-participant exception and define its scope are the moral and political
entitlement of state residents to the benefit of state funds and the
built-in spending restraints of resident preference laws. Applying
these two rationales may result in judicial restraint and respect for
federalism on occasion, but these latter two rationales cannot determine when such restraint or respect is in fact desirable and when it
is not.
B. Market-Participant Theory and State-Mandated
Preference Laws
Although some state-mandated preference laws may not satisfy
the two justifications for the market-participant exception - the
entitlement and built-in restraints rationales - many others will.
Thus, courts should not categorically reject applying the marketparticipant exception to such laws. In the language of the marketparticipant cases, some state-mandated laws should be impermissible "downstream restrictions" while others should be permissible
"market participation."
Many state-mandated preference laws have the same legitimacy.
under the entitlement theory as preference laws that operate on just
the state level. When local governments spend funds in accordance
with a state-mandated preference law, those governments are still
spending money contributed by residents. Professor Coenen has
argued that the "sow-and-reap" rationale only partially supports
state-mandated preference laws because the state is not distributing
money that is "fairly attributable to all residents of the state." Instead, he argues that such laws require local governments to spend
their "own" money in certain ways.82 While this is true, it should
not be a fatal concern under the dormant Commerce Clause. One
of the main evils the dormant Commerce Clause exists to prevent is
discrimination against nonresidents who are politically powerless to
influence the policies of the discriminating state.83 Residents living
81. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 450 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("A State
frequently will respond to market conditions on the basis of political rather than economic
concerns."); see also Phillips, supra note 61, at 378; Note, Home-State Preferences in Public
Contracting: A Study in Economic Balkanization, 58 IowA L. REv. 576, 585 (1973); supra
note 80.
82. Coenen, supra note 62, at 483 n.497. Professor Coenen also argues that concerns of
federalism and state experimentation diminish under state-mandated preference laws because local governments become less able to respond to the local will. Id. He notes, however, that traditional concerns of federalism surround the state's ability, and not that of local
governments, to experiment with different policies. Id.
83. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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under a particular local government, unlike nonresidents of the
state, are not politically powerless. These residents can petition the '
state to eliminate state-mandated preference laws if they feel that
other residents who have not contributed to local government funds
are unfairly benefitting from such funds. As long as the state is
directing funds supplied in some way by residents, rather than taking funds from nonresidents, then the entitlement rationale should
still apply. This result is particularly true if the state has supplied
some or all of the local government's funding.
Many state-mandated preference laws also do not place a larger
burden on commerce than a preference law that only applies to the
state government. There are two ways in which such laws could
present a greater burden. First, state-mandated preference laws do
not have as strong a built-in "expensiveness" restraint on their enactment. Particularly when the state is directing the expenditure of
funds raised by local governments, such laws will not be as expensive to the state because it is not spending funds from its own treasury.84 Second, state-mandated preference laws could potentially
affect a far greater number of contracting parties than merely statelevel preferences because local governments are responsible for
most public contracting.85 States need not enact state-mandated
preference laws that operate so broadly, however. There are a
number of ways to limit the operation of a state-mandated preference law that would greatly reduce the burden on interstate commerce that such a law might pose, such as imposing geographical or
temporal limitations on the law.s6 SuGh limitations could produce a
state-mandated preference law that is far less burdensome than
state-level preference laws currently upheld under the marketparticipant exception.
Therefore, rather than rejecting state-mandated preferences categorically, as at least one commentator has advocated,87 courts
should seek to distinguish between those laws that fit within the
rationales for the market-participant exception - thus constituting
84. See Coenen, supra note 62, at 483.
85. See W.C.M. Window Co. v. Bernardi, 73(} F.2d 486, 496 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating that
state-mandated preference laws "could do great damage to the principles of free trade on
which the negative commerce clause is based" because local governments do far more contracting than state governments). But see Trojan Technologies v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903
(3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1212 (1991):
It may be true that local municipalities and authorities are responsible for the great bulk
of sub-national public procurement. However, we find no suggestion in the Supreme
Court's previous forays into this area that the quantum of market purchases should affect a public entity's qualification for market participant status.
916 F.2d at 911.
86. See infra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
Erl. See Coenen, supra note 62, at 483 (arguing tentatively that state-mandated preference
laws should always violate the dormant Commerce Clause).
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valid "market-participation" - and those that ~o not - thus constituting impermissible "downstream restrictions." Part m refines
the market-participant exception to handle this task, drawing on
dormant Commerce Clause and Privileges and Immunities case law.
Before that, however, section II.C explains why the current interpretation of the market-participant exception, which focuses on the
relationship between states and their local governments, fails to distinguish valid state-mandated preference laws from invalid ones.
C. Market-Participant Theory and State-Local Relationships
Under current market-participant doctrine, courts have evaluated the constitutionality of state-mandated preference laws based
on whether they characterize the relationship between a state and
its local governments as one of dependence or mdependence.88
Following the traditional approach, courts assume that local governments are "creatures of the state" and that states enacting statemandated preferences laws "through" them are market-participants.89 The more contemporary approach requires courts to determine the actual independence of local governments, calling the
state a market participant only when it is mandating the contracting
of dependent local governments.90 Neither approach, however, allows courts to distinguish between legitimate, less burdensome
state-mandated preference laws and those that excessively burden
interstate commerce.
The traditional approach to state-local relationships completely
fails to evaluate state-mandated preference laws in terms of the justifications for the market-participant exception. By assuming dependence, this approach concludes that all state-mandated
preference laws are valid under the dormant Commerce Clause.
However, some state-mandated preference laws may dictate the use
of money that is not fairly attributable to the state. In cases in
which the federal government has provided the lion's share of funding, or in which nonresidents have contributed to the state's funds
through taxes and licensing fees, residents do not have the justification for favoring themselves in public contracting. Furthermore,
some preference laws may have such widespread effects that courts
should strike them down despite any such justification. The traditional approach to state-local relationships would allow the state to
tell every single city, county, municipality, school board, or other
political subdivision, to hire only residents, to buy only goods made
by residents, and to sell goods made with state funds only to residents for any length of time and for any reason. The scope of this
88. See supra section I.e.
89. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
90. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
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preferential treatment would dwarf other forms of discrimination
that the court has struck down under the dormant Commerce
Clause.91
The more contemporary approach to state-local relationships
does not fare much better. This approach at least condemns some
state-mandated preference laws as violating the dormant Commerce Clause - namely those that act on autonomous local governments. The distinction this approach draws, however, has little
to do with the legitimacy of the state's action or the potential burden on interstate commerce. Moreover, the test for determining
autonomy is susceptible to manipulation by state legislatures. They
ultimately control the distribution of power within the state, and
they could alter the balance whenever they wished to create a "dependent" local government from one that was formerly "autonomous."92 Even the best test for determining autonomy in the
dormant Commerce Clause context would not produce results that
comport with the justifications for the market-participant exception. The best test would probably focus on the amount of financial
support that the state has supplied because residents can definitely
claim a legitimate entitlement to state funds that are merely spent
through local governments. Yet, this test would fail to strike down
91. See supra notes 7, 26 and accompanying text.
92. Even if courts treated the issue of local government autonomy as a federal one, state
law would undoubtedly influence their finding. In the areas in which courts already attempt
to measure local government autonomy, see supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text, they
primarily look to state law for guidance. See, e.g., Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 401-02 (1979) (balancing six factors: 1) the state's designation of the agency; 2) the relative power of appointment between the state and the agency; 3)
the agency's funding; 4) the nonbinding aspect of the agency's obligations; 5) the agency's
primary mission; and 6) the state's lack of veto power over agency rules); Mt. Healthy City
Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977) (balancing four factors: 1) the
state's designation of the school board; 2) the degree of state supervision; 3) the level of state
funding; and 4) the school board's capacity to generate revenue); see also Alex E. Rogers,
Note, Clothing State Governmental Entities with Sovereign Immunity: Disarray in the Eleventh Amendment Arm-of-State Doctrine, 92 CoLUM. L. REv. 1243, 1269 (1992) (summarizing
the factors employed by lower courts into five categories: 1) the entity's functions; 2) the
degree of state control; 3) the entity's powers, especially fiscal autonomy; 4) the state's
designation of the entity; and 5) the financial liability of the state for the entity's legal
violations).
Another, albeit less important, argument against attempts to measure local government
autonomy is that such attempts have met with little success. See ERWIN CHEMERJNSKY, FED·
ERAL Juruso1cnoN § 7.4, at 387 (2d ed. 1994) (stating that "the law concerning the [11th
Amendment] immunity of state agencies, boards, and other entities ••• is quite inconsistent"); Rogers, supra, at 1269 (stating that "the courts craft disparate tests and rely upon
vague factors, thereby generating conflicting results"). A prime example of such conflict
occurred when the Second and Third Circuit Courts of Appeals split on whether the Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey was a dependent political subdivision or an autonomous entity for the purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. See Feeney v. Port Auth. TransHudson Corp., 873 F.2d 628 (2d Cir. 1989), affd. on other grounds, 495 U.S. 299 (1990); Port
Auth. Police Benevolent Assn. v. Port Auth., 819 F.2d 413 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 953
(1987). The Supreme Court eventually decided this issue in Hess v. Port Authority TransHudson Corp., 115 S. Ct. 394 (1994).
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those state-mandated preference laws that impose excessive burdens on interstate commerce despite the claim of entitlement. In
addition, this test would fail to allow state-mandated preference
laws that operate completely on local funding but that pose little
threat to interstate commerce.
Ultimately, focusing on the relationship between the state and
its local governments has little to do with the concerns of the dormant Commerce Clause. The dormant Commerce Clause protects
legitimate regulations that do not pose an excessive burden to interstate commerce. The traditional approach ignores both of these
concerns. The more contemporary approach, if crafted and applied
properly, would at least protect the state's legitimate ability to prefer its own residents in some instances, but it does so without any
reference to the burden on interstate commerce. Therefore, courts
must develop a different approach to evaluating the constitutionality of state-mandated preference laws that comports with the rationales for the market-participant exception as identified in this Note.
III.

APPLYING THE MARKET-PARTICIPANT EXCEPTION TO
STATE-MANDATED PREFERENCE LAWS

Some commentators have urged courts to apply the market-participant exception to the dormant Commerce Clause in a more substantive manner.93 This Note similarly argues that courts should
apply the market-participant exception with reference to the rationales identified in this Note that justify and define the scope of the
exception. Fortunately, there is already some guidance within the
law to help craft such an approach. A more substantive approach
to the market-participant exception can draw upon the Supreme
Court's long-standing jurisprudence under the dormant Commerce
Clause and also that of the Privileges and Immunities Clause.
Privileges and Immuriities Clause doctrine provides a particularly apt analogy to dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, at least
with respect to issues of interstate economic discrimination. The
two clauses have similar historical origins.94 In . addition, cases
93. See White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204, 218 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The line between regulation and market
participation, for purposes of the Commerce Clause, should be drawn with reference to the
constitutional values giving rise to the market participant exemption itself."); Coenen, supra
note 62, at 398 (arguing that courts should examine the "competing constitutional values"
underlying the market-participant cases); Regan, supra note 29, at 1196-97 (arguing that
courts should engage in line-drawing based on the criteria of whether the state is spending its
own money in order to determine whether the market-participant applies to a particular state
activity).
94. The Framers derived both clauses from the fourth article of the Articles of Confederation, which was to "secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the
people of different States." Th.mE, supra note 5, § 6-35, at 537 (quoting ART. CoNFED. art.
IV); see also Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978) (stating that the clauses have a "shared
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under the Privileges and Immunities Clause recognize that states
are entitled to favor their own residents when spending residents'
money.9s Furthermore, these cases also recognize that the Privileges and Immunities Clause protects against the economic and
political balkanization that discrimination against nonresidents
often causes.96 Logically, these cases produce the same balance
that exists under the dormant Commerce Clause - governments
can favor their own citizens when they are spending state money
but they are limited in the extent to which they can do so.97
vision of federalism"). At least one commentator has argued that the modern dormant Com·
merce Clause actually fulfills the role envisioned by the Framers for the Privileges and Immunities Clause. See Eule, supra note 79, at 446-55; see also Charles L. Black, Jr., Perspectives
on the American Common Market, in REGULATION, FEDERAUSM, AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE 59, 65 (A. Dan Tarlock ed. 1981). But see Regan, supra note 29, at 1202-06 (arguing
that sufficient distinctions exist between the Commerce Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause to maintain separate bodies of doctrine).
There is one significant historical difference between the two clauses. Corporations may
not sue under the Privileges and Immunities Clause because, under that clause, they do not
qualify as citizens. Western & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 665
(1981); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 177, 181 (1869) (suggesting in dicta that the
term "citizens" in the Privileges and Immunities Clause refers only to natural persons"). But
see Eule, supra note 79, at 451 (arguing that the "legal underpinnings" of this rule are "no
longer sound"); Martin H. Redish and Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and
the Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DuKE LI. 569, 610-11 ("From a policy perspective, there can be little doubt that corporations should receive the protection of the privileges and immunities clause.").
95. Under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Supreme Court has allowed states to
prefer residents in public education, see Martinez v~ Bynum, 461 U.S. 321 (1983}, public welfare programs, see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (striking down a one-year resi·
dency requirement for welfare benefits not because of the requirement itself but because of
its unjustified duration), and hiring for public construction jobs, see United Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208 (1984). In United Building, the Court
explicitly recognized this justification:
The fact that Camden is expending its own funds or funds it administers in accordance
with the terms of a grant is certainly a factor - perhaps the crucial factor - to be
considered in evaluating whether the statute's discnmination violates the Privileges and
Immunities Clause...•
. . . States should have considerable leeway in analyzing local evils and in prescribing
appropriate cures." This caution is particularly appropriate when a government body is
merely setting conditions on the expenditure of funds it controls.
465 U.S. at 221-23 (citation omitted) (quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948));
see also TRIBE, supra note 5, § 6-35, at 541 (observing that state creation of a resource or
other good would remain a powerful argument for justifying discrimination under the Privi·
leges and Immunities Clause).
96. See Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Commn., 436 U.S. 371, 388 (1978) (stating that
the clause protects the "maintenance or well-being of the Union"); Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 660-61 (1975) (stating that the Framers created the clause to safeguard
"all the privileges of trade and commerce") (quoting ART. CoNFEo. art. IV).
97. As Professor Tribe observes:
Police and fire departments are quintessentially creatures of the state, supported by state
or local revenue and operated for the good of the local citizenry, yet it is inconceivable
that a state would be permitted to deny police and fire protection to tourists or short·
term visitors, or to charge a premium to those just passing through for the service of
extinguishing a blaze or apprehending a hit-and-run perpetrator. Discrimination against
non-residents with respect to such basic advantages of civilization would surely under·
mine national cohesion and deter intercourse among the states.
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Section ID.A describes how courts can refine their approach to
state-mandated preference laws under the market-participant exception with guidance from case law under the dormant Commerce
Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Section ID.B
then applies this approach to the federal cases that have split on the
constitutionality of state-mandated preference laws.

A. A More Substantive Application of the Market-Participant
Exception
Any application of the market-participant exception should take
into account the two rationales that support and define the scope of
the exception - entitlement and built-in restraints. This approach
will guarantee that market-participant decisions rest on substantive
analysis rather than on blind labeling. Moreover, this approach
conforms naturally to traditional dormant Commerce Clause and
Privileges and Immunities analysis.
Because the market-participant exception derives from dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the latter provides a ready guide
for the former. Dormant Commerce Clause analysis consists of two
parts. First, courts look for a legitimate purpose for the state regulation.9s Second, they balance the local benefits achieved by the
regulation against the burden it imposes on interstate commerce.99
Under the justifications for the market-participant exception, states
have a legitimate purpose when enacting contractual preferences they can prefer residents when they spend funds contributed by
those residents. Moreover, the built-in restraints on state spending
make preference laws less likely to burden commerce substantially.
Thus, on balance, courts should be willing to uphold some preference laws, whereas they should always strike down other discriminatory measures, such as discriminatory taxes on nonresidents. The
Supreme Court has at least implicitly condoned this reasoning in
the dormant Commerce Clause context by upholding under the
market-participant exception state laws that prefer residents when
buying scrap metal,100 selling state-produced cement,101 and hiring
supra note 5, § 6-35, at 540-41 (footnotes omitted). The Supreme Court has stated,
however, that current market-participant' doctrine is not in harmony with current privileges
and immunities doctrine in this regard. See United Bldg., 465 U.S. at 220 ("This concern with
comity [under the Privileges and Immunities Clause] cuts across the market regulator-market
participant distinction that is crucial under the Commerce Clause.").
TRIBE,

98. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
100. See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
101. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 439 (1980).
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construction workers,102 while striking down other discriminatory
regulations that do not involve state spending.103
Although this balancing approach is merely implicit in the
Supreme Court's market-participant cases, the Court explicitly performs a similar sort of balancing in the context of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause. First, the Court determines whether a state
regulation burdens a fundamental privilege of nol!l'esidents.104 If
the regulation does burden a fundamental privilege, the Court will
still uphold the discriminatory regulation if the state can demonstrate that nonresidents are a "peculiar source of evil" to residents
and that the discrimination is substantially related to that evn.10s
The Supreme Court's decision in United Building & Construction Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden106 applied this analysis to
the city of Camden's preferential municipal ordinance, which required at least forty percent of the employees of contractors or subcontractors working on city construction projects to be Camden
residents. 107 The Supreme Court determined that the opportunity
to seek a job with these private employers is " 'sufficiently basic to
the livelihood of the Nation' as to fall within the purview of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause."1os On the record presented, the
102. See White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
103. See supra notes 7, 26.
104. See Baldwin v. Montana Game & Fish. Commn., 436 U.S. 371, 383 (1978); Toomer v.
Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948). The concept of a "fundamental privilege" is more expansive than the concept of a "fundamental interest" under other provisions of the Constitution.
The Equal Protection Clause, for example, defines fundamental interests to include only
those rights explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution, such as the right to vote,
see Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), or the right of interstate migration, see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). Fundamental privileges under the Privileges and Immunities Clause include many of the same interests, but they also include
interests such as access to medical services, see Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); equal
taxes, see Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 661 (1975); private jobs, see Hicklin v.
Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978); and "the pursuit of happiness," see Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8
Wall.) 168, 180 (1869).
105. Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 383; Toomer, 334 U.S. at 398.
106. 465 U.S. 208 (1984).
107. See 465 U.S. at 210. Camden enacted the ordinance pursuant to a statewide affirmative action program subject to the State Treasurer's approval. Because of this statewide program, the Col!rt stated that the constitutional challenge to the preference law must also " 'be
interpreted as a challenge to the State Treasurer's general power' to adopt such a preference." 465 U.S. at 215 (quoting United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden,
443 A.2d 148, 154 (N.J. 1983)). Therefore, the Court's analysis arguably applies to statemandated preference laws as well.
108. 465 U.S. at 221-22 (quoting Baldwin v. Montana F"ish & Game Commn., 436 U.S.
371, 388 (1978)). It is unclear whether, in the context of a state-mandated preference law,
access to public construction jobs should constitute a fundamental privilege. The only court
to address this issue implicitly held that access to such jobs should constitute a fundamental
privilege. See W.C.M. Wmdow Co. v. Bernardi, 730 F.2d 486, 497-98 (7th Cir. 1984). This
result makes sense, especially when the resident construction workers are actually working
for private contractors. Even when the construction workers work directly for the government, however, access to their jobs should probably constitute a fundamental privilege.
Otherwise states could merely pay workers directly rather than through contractors and
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Court would not decide whether economic and social problems in
Camden justified the preference law.109 The Court definitely implied, however, that some preference laws can survive scrutiny
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause.110
The approach taken by lower courts applying the Privileges and
Immunities Clause to resident-preference laws - and in one case a
state-mandated preference law111 - provides particularly apt guidance for analyzing such laws under the market-participant exception to the dormant Commerce Clause. First, these courts examine
the record for evidence that nonresidents actually pose an economic "evil" to residents.112 If the state cannot establish this
threshold fact, then the court will automatically strike down the
preference law.113 Next, these courts determine whether the state
has narrowly tailored an appropriate remedy. 114 The test requires a
close fit between the evil posed by nonresidents and the remedy for
that evil.115 When courts strike down resident-preference laws,
generally the state has failed to produce evidence of an evil to be
corrected or it has failed to narrowly tailor the remedy.116
As under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, courts should
carefully scrutinize resident preference laws under the marketparticipant exception. First, they should ensure that the state has a
legitimate basis for the preference - that the state is actually redistributing the residents' money. Then they should demand evidence
of a positive local benefit that the preference law will achieve beyond merely increasing the income of residents. 117 For example,
the preference law might aim temporarily to alleviate serious unemavoid the strictures of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. But see Massachusetts Bd. of
Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) {holding that there is no fundamental right to
government employment for the purposes of the Equal Protection Clause).
109. The Court remanded the issue, but the case settled before the state court could
make a final determination of whether sufficient reasons existed for the discrimination. See
1st Westco Corp. v. School District, 811 F. Supp. 204, 207 (E.D. Pa 1993).
110. See Gergen, supra note 77, at 1100 n.12 (noting that "the Court [in United Building]
clearly indicated that hiring preferences for citizens are sometimes permissible").
111. See W.C.M. Window, 730 F.2d at 497-98 (striking down a state-mandated preference
law because Illinois failed to produce evidence of the evil the state wanted to correct).
112. See, e.g., W.C.M. Window, 730 F.2d at 497-98; 1st Westco, 811 F. Supp. at 207-08.
113. See W.C.M. Window, 730 F.2d at 497-98.
114. See 1st Westco, 811 F. Supp. at 207-08.
115. See TRIBE, supra note 5, § 6-35, at 544 (comparing the Supreme Court's "insistence
on a fairly precise fit between remedy and classification" to the Warren Court's strict scrutiny
of Equal Protection and First Amendment issues).
116. See W.C.M. Window, 730 F.2d at 497-98; 1st Westco, 811 F. Supp. at 207-08; see also
Neshaminy Constructors v. Krause, 437 A.2d 733, 737 n.6 (NJ. Ch. 1981), modified on unrelated grounds and ajfd., 453 A.2d 1359 (NJ. App. 1982); Salla v. County of Monroe, 399
N.E.2d 909 (N.Y. 1979); Laborers Local Union No. 374 v. Felton Constr., 654 P.2d 67 {Wash.
1982).
117. Cf. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 451 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the Court should first determine whether the state "participated in the market as a pri-
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ployment in a particular geographic area or type of employment,
such as highway construction, or it might temporarily buy the products of a struggling health-sensitive resident industry, such as milk
production. 118 Furthermore, courts should ensure that a resident
preference law is reasonably necessary to achieve this benefit. In
particular, courts should examine whether any less discriminatory
alternatives exist,119 or whether the state has limited the temporal
or economic scope of the regulation. For example, the state might
supply some of the money to operate the preference law, or the law
might only last for six months, or it might only apply to major urban
areas or particular industries, or it might limit the percentage of
purchases or job openings that will favor residents.120 This analysis
will ensure that states do not enact regulations that unduly burden
interstate commerce. If the state fails to produce evidence of a sufficient local benefit or if the state fails to narrowly tailor its preference law, then a court should strike the law down as a violation of
the dormant Commerce Clause. Otherwise, a court should uphold
the law under the market-participant exception.
B. Resolving the Split Between the Circuit Courts of Appeals

An analysis of the opinions of those circuits that have passed on
the constitutionality of state-mandated preference laws demonstrates the utility of applying the substantive approach outlined in
this Note to such laws rather than the current market-participant
approach. The substantive approach avoids the difficulty of attempting to determine whether a particular local government is dependent upon the state government or whether it in fact retains
sufficient autonomy. Moreover, the substantive approach allows
courts to distinguish between state-mandated preference laws that
comport with the rationales for the market-participant exception
and those that do not.
Applying the substantive market-participant exception approach suggests that the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals correctly
vate firm" and then evaluate whether the state's action "burdens the flow of interstate
commerce").
118. See Dean Mill: Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951} (recognizing that ensuring the
supply of wholesome milk is a valid state objective).
119. See supra note 30 and accompanying text; see also White v. Massachusetts Council of
Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204, 225 (1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (arguing that Boston could have devised less discriminatory alternatives to its resident preference law).
120. But see White, 460 U.S. at 217 n.3 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("That the order limits the preference to 50% of the covered jobs is, of course, not
relevant to the applicability of the market participant exemption. If such preferences do not
implicate the dormant Commerce Clause, they are immune even if they apply to 100% of a
contractor's jobs.").
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decided W. C.M. Window Co. v. Bemardi. 121 In this case, the Seventh Circuit struck down a state-mandated preference law requiring
all contractors with local governments to hire only Illinois residents
unless such residents were unavailable.122 The court noted that Illinois failed to produce any evidence on the employment rate in Illinois's construction industry, the costs to the state of unemployment,
the effect of a resident preference on unemployment, or the benefit
of the preference compared to the inefficiency of not hiring nonresidents.123 In addition, the court relied on an uncontradicted affidavit that the state did not even partially finance the operation of the
law as it applied in the case.124 Thus, Illinois failed to adduce any
evidence of the benefit of the state-mandated preference law, and it
failed to narrowly tailor the law by supplying some money to the
local governments or limiting the number of contractors to whom
the law applied. Although Illinois may legitimately spend its own
money to benefit residents in some instances, the State failed to
prove that the benefit of this regulation exceeded its burden on in~
terstate commerce.
The substantive approach to applying the market-participant exception also suggests that the Third Circuit Court of Appeals correctly decided Trojan Technologies v. Pennsylvania. 125 In this case,
the Third Circuit upheld a law that required all local governments
to buy American-made steel.126 The court's focus on the relationship between the state and its local governments,127 however, demonstrates how that approach ignores the real concerns of the
dormant Commerce Clause. The real dormant Commerce Clause
concern implicated in Trojan Technologies was the burden on interstate commerce created by the buy-American law. Proper analysis
of this issue would begin by noting that a buy-American law does
not discriminate against other states; it merely discriminates against
foreign commerce. Such a law does not pose a threat to interstate
commerce. Courts examining state-mandated buy-American laws
must ensure only that such laws do not unduly burden foreign commerce.128 If a state-mandated buy-American law does not unduly
burden foreign commerce, then a court should always uphold the
121. 730 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1984).
122. See supra note 14.
123. See W.C.M. Window, 730 F.2d at 498.
124. See 730 F.2d at 495.
125. 916 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1990).
126. See 916 F.2d at 904-05.
127. See 916 F.2d at 910-12.
128. See 916 F.2d at 912-13; see also Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 437-38 n.9 (noting
in a market-participant case that Commerce aause scrutiny may be higher when foreign
commerce is involved).
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law under the market-participant exception to the dormant Commerce Clause.
In Big Country Foods v. Board of Education, 12 9 the court's decision seems inconsistent with a more substantive approach to the
market-participant exception. The Ninth Circuit upheld an Alaskan preference statute that required schools receiving funds from
the state government to buy dairy products harvested in the state,
despite the fact that the federal government in fact supplied the
funds for the program.130 Because Alaska did not actually supply
the funds, it did not have a legitimate entitlement to prefer its own
citizens.131 Nevertheless, the case provides a good example of how
a state can diminish the effect on interstate commerce of a statemandated preference law. The state limited the program to a single
group of local government entities - school boards - and to a
single type of product - milk. Moreover, the state required the
school boards to buy like-quality, nonresident-harvested milk when
the price of resident-harvested milk exceeded nonresident prices by
more than seven percent.132
CONCLUSION

Courts should take a more substantive approach to applying the
market-participant exception to state-mandated preference laws
rather than focusing on state-local government relationships. This
substantive approach should recognize the concerns of the dormant
Commerce Clause - allowing legitimate state regulation while
preventing undue burdens on interstate commerce - and the legitimate justifications for the market-participant exception - preferring residents with state funds in a manner that poses less risk of
burdening interstate commerce. First, the court should ensure that
the preference law applies to the expenditure of state or local resident funds, rather than federal or nonresident funds. Then, it
129. 952 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1992).
130. See 952 F.2d at 1175, 1179-80.
131. The court expressly rejected this argument under its interpretation of White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204 (1983). See Big Country, 952 F.2d at
1179-80; see also Swin Resource Sys. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245, 250 (3d Cir. 1989},
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1077 (1990) (rejecting, on the basis of White, the argument that federal
funding made the market-participant exception inapplicable). The court in Big Country
stated at great length, however, its apparent sympathy with the argument that the use of
federal funding should make a difference:
We recognize there are strong public policy arguments to the contrary. It may be
asserted with some logic that the use of federal as opposed to state or local funding
allows Alaska to reap what it has not sown; that the underlying commerce clause value
of a free market is undermined when the federal government in essence subsidizes one
state's industry; and that a state differs from the usual market participant in that the
state has the ability to obtain federal subsidies for its purchases.
952 F.2d at 1180 (citation omitted).
132. See 952 F.2d at 1175.
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should examine whether the preference's burden on interstate commerce substantially outweighs the state's proffered benefit. If the
state cannot provide adequate evidence of the benefit, if less discriminatory alternatives exist, or if the burden of the preference law
is too great, then the court should strike down the law as a violation
of the dormant Commerce Clause. Otherwise, the court should uphold the law under the market-participant exception.
Ultimately, courts should apply this more substantive marketparticipant exception to all resident-preference laws.- The Supreme
Court's current market-participant jurisprudence implies that
whenever a state is directly participating in the market by spending
its own funds, the Court will uphold a discriminatory resident preference without examining its burden on interstate commerce. The
limitation posed by the dormant Commerce Clause on the rationales for the market-participant exception is the same, however,
whether a preference law operates only on the state government or
whether it operates on local governments as well - at some point
even the most justifiable resident preferences can impose an unreasonably high burden on interstate commerce. Adopting the substantive approach to the market-participant exception for all
resident-preference laws would bring logic and consistency into this
area of the law by providing clear guidelines for lower courts and by
harmonizing market-participant doctrine with existing dormant
Commerce Clause and Privileges and Immunities jurisprudence.

